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NEGATION IN LOGIC PROGRAMMING 
KENNETH KUNEN* 
D We define a semantics for negation as failure in logic programming. Our 
semantics may be viewed as a cross between the approaches of Clark [5] 
and Fitting [7]. As does [7], our semantics corresponds well with real 
PROLOG in the standard examples used in the literature to illustrate 
problems with [5]. Also, PROLOG and the common variants of it are sound 
but not complete for our semantics. Unlike [7], our semantics is construc- 
tive, in that the set of supported queries is recursively enumerable. Thus, a 
complete interpreter exists in theory, although we point out that there are 
serious difficulties in building one that works well in practice. a 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The question of negation in logic programming has been frequently discussed in the 
literature. The goal of these investigations has been to find a declarative semantics 
for negation which corresponds to the way PROLOG-style languages actually treat 
negation. We describe such a semantics here. The outcome of our approach is a 
semantics which is a cross between the completed database obtained by Clark [5] 
and the 3-valued logic approach advanced by Fitting [7]. Our semantics is more 
restrictive than either of these approaches, in the sense that any query which follows 
from the database under our semantics also follows under both [5] and [7]; but not 
conversely, as we will show by some examples. 
Although our semantics is more restrictive, it is still true that any PROLOG-style 
interpreter will be sound under our semantics, provided that we remedy two features 
of standard PROLOG implementations which are commonly agreed to be in error. 
One is that we assume that unification is always done with an occurs check. The 
other is in the treatment of a negated nonground literal; we discuss this in greater 
detail in Section 3. 
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The question of completeness is more difficult. In the ground (propositional) case, 
we describe an abstract interpreter which is both sound and complete for our 
semantics; this interpreter is essentially standard PROLOG, but with the user’s 
ordering of the clauses and of the literals within each clause replaced by a 
nondeterministic (or a parallel) execution. The fact that our semantics corresponds 
exactly with such an abstract PROLOG, whereas [5] does not, could be taken as an 
argument in favor of our approach. For ground databases, our semantics is identical 
with that of [7]. In the nonground case, although there exists a complete evaluation 
procedure in theory (i.e., unlike in [7], the set of answers to queries is recursively 
enumerable), we do not believe that any such procedure is practical to implement. 
The basic idea behind our approach, as in all others, is “negation as failure”. 
Roughly, this means that if the interpreter fails to verify (Y, then TV is taken as 
verified. This is justified for two reasons. First, it corresponds to the way PROLOG 
works. Second, it is often more convenient for database applications than is pure 
resolution logic, since the database need only contain positive relational informa- 
tion, and need not include the negations of all false relations. The problems begin in 
trying to find a coherent formal semantics behind this rough idea. 
2. SYNTAX 
We use standard PROLOG-style syntax. Variables begin with capital letters. Iden- 
tifiers beginning with lowercase letters can be constants, function symbols, or 
predicate symbols. Terms are constructed from variables, constants, and function 
symbols. Atomic formulas (or positive literals) are constructed from predicate 
symbols and terms. Arbitrary predicate logic formulas are built up from atomic 
formulas using propositional connectives and quantifiers. 
We wish to think of PROLOG clauses as embedded syntactically in ordinary 
predicate logic, although the semantics will be nonstandard. To this end, we think of 
“not” and “ T” as synonymous, and “,” and “ A” as synonymous, and we think of 
“c+ + I/J” as synonymous with “# :- $“. For example, the PROLOG clause 
“(Y :- @, y ” is equivalent with the predicate-logic formula “(p A y) + (Y”. So that 
we don’t have to make special cases for clauses with empty body, we think of our 
logic as including the atom true; thus, the clause “a.” can be written as “(Y :- true”. 
Program clauses (which we expect to find in the database) are expressions of the 
form 
(Y:-&,...,X,. 
In the semantics, these clauses are considered to be universally quantified. Query 
clauses are expressions of the form 
A A”. l,“‘, 
They are thought of as being existentially quantified. In all cases, the head of a 
program clause, CY, is an atomic formula. We will consider three possibilities for 
what the Xi in the body of a program clause or in a query clause can be. In pure 
Horn clause logic, they must also be atomic formulas. In generakzed clause logic, 
they can be arbitrary literals (atomic formulas or their negations). In extended clause 
logic, they can be arbitrary formulas of predicate logic. The terminology for these 
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last two notions is borrowed from [17]. It is the generalized program clauses which 
correspond most closely to standard PROLOG. 
The semantics for pure Horn clauses is well known and noncontroversial (see 
[16]); the difficulties lie with the passage to generalized clauses and the interpreta- 
tion of the negations in the body of these clauses. Once this difficulty is conquered, 
there seems to be no problem dealing with extended clauses. [17] gives a translation 
from extended program clauses into generalized program clauses and shows this 
translation to be valid for Clark’s semantics; it is also valid for Fitting’s semantics 
[7] and our semantics (Theorem 6.7). Thus, although we shall define our semantics 
for extended program clauses, our theorems and examples will be concentrated 
mainly on generalized program clauses. 
The fact that we are making our basic definitions for extended program clauses 
will allow us a syntactical simplification. That is, we may replace each body of a 
program clauses by its conjunction (or true if the body is empty), so that every 
extended program clause is simply of the form 
(Y:- +., 
where LY is an atomic formula and $I is any predicate logic formula. 
If + is any formula, we let V$ be the universal closure of $J (formed by 
universally quantifying all free variables), and !l+ the existential closure. 
For convenience, we follow the usual convention in mathematical ogic and 
assume that the same identifier cannot be used in two different contexts. This 
departs from standard PROLOG, where for example, 
PM P(Y)) :--P. 
is perfectly legal. The PROLOG interpreter views the three occurrences of p as 
completely unrelated symbols: a 2-place predicate, a l-place function, and a O-place 
predicate (proposition letter). Our convention obviously does not affect the basic 
theory. 
3. IDEAL LOGIC PROGRAMMING 
We consider the abstract model of a PROLOG-style interpreter, where there is a 
database, DB, on line, consisting of a finite set of program clauses, and the user 
addresses query clauses, +, to the database. Recalling that + is thought of as being 
.existentially quantified (Z&J), our ideal interpreter should return one of three kinds 
of answers. The first is “no” (3~ is not a consequence of DB). The second is one or 
more substitutions, u (i.e., V+a is a consequence of DB); if + is ground, so that u is 
irrelevant, the answer can just be “yes”. In these two cases, we call the “no” or the 
“U ” a solution to the query. The third answer possible is “unclear”. By “unclear”, 
we mean either that the interpreter in fact fails to halt, or that it halts and prints an 
error message rather than a solution. 
The goal of logic programming is summarized by Kowalksi’s “Algorithm = Logic 
+ Control” [12]. We take this to mean that the analysis of a PROLOG-style 
language can be broken up into a logic component and a control component. 
The logic component should give us a declarative semantics of the language which 
tells us whether or not V+o indeed follows semantically from DB. The exact nature 
of this declarative semantics is a matter of some controversy which this paper partly 
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addresses. The problems with negation and other PROLOG constructs make it clear 
that the semantics cannot be precisely the standard semantics of first-order predi- 
cate logic, but it is important that it be declarative-that is, phrased in terms of 
logical notions such as truth, model, and satisfaction. The user should be able to 
understand the semantics just by “logic”, not by a detailed understanding of the 
implementation of the interpreter. It is really this key fact which separates logic 
programming from more conventional procedural forms of programming. 
The control component consists of guides to the PROLOG interpreter to help it 
decide whether or not a query is a logical consequences of DB. In PROLOG, the 
primary control mechanism is the ordering given to the clauses in the database and 
to the literals in each clause; many more sophisticated mechanisms have been 
advanced in the literature. Since the control should not affect the semantics, it is not 
the subject of this paper. We remark only that many common PROLOG features 
(such as cut), which are often referred to as “control” in the literature, do affect the 
semantics and in fact render the interpreter unsound. 
The basic requirement of any PROLOG interpreter should be soundness; that is, 
if an answer u is returned for a query (p, then V+a does in fact follow semantically 
from DB, while if “no” is returned, then 3~ does not follow. We view the machine’s 
answer of “unclear” as a lack of commitment as to whether 3+ does or does not 
follow, so that any interpreter which always returns “unclear” is trivially sound (and 
useless). 
We remark now on the problem of “not” applied to literals with variables. This is 
illustrated by the following example (from [16, p. 821): 
4:- not(r(X)), p(X). 
PW- 
r(b)- 
Conventional PROLOG will return a “no” to the query “ :- q?“, whereas it would 
return a “yes” if the ordering on the literals in the body of the first clause is 
reversed. This behavior must be unsound under any semantics in which A is 
commutative. Here, most approaches to PROLOG semantics agree that the correct 
answer is “yes”. The problem is that the correct semantics views the subgoal 
“not( r( X))” as with a 3 understood (as in all goals); here it is 3X,r( X); while the 
interpreter runs as if it were testing for ,3Xr( X) (and fails when some X= b 
satisfying r is found). There are various possibilities for what a sound PROLOG 
interpreter should do if it is asked to evaluate “not r(X)“. The simplest answer, 
given by Clark [5], is that it should simply return “unclear”. More complicated 
answers, such as those used in the systems IC-PROLOG [6] and MU-PROLOG 
[20,21], will return solutions for more general classes of queries, but these systems 
are still sound for the semantics described in this paper (see Section 9). In any case, 
our soundness results apply only to systems which correctly understand a goal of 
-,+ to mean 3(,cp) and not ,@$I). 
4. COMPARISON WITH OTHER APPROACHES 
Many of the key ideas of our semantics occur elsewhere in the literature, but not 
with the same outcome. 
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One idea, due to Clark, is that the database really says more than it seems to at 
first sight. He adds an extra symbol, = , and extends the database to a completed 
database (CDB) by converting all clauses to “iff’ assertions and adding some 
equality axioms; see [5], or [16, p. 701, or Section 5 below. Some problems involved 
with the CDB are discussed in [8]. 
Another idea is Reiter’s domain closure axiom (DCA) [22], which says that the 
Herbrand universe (the set of all closed terms) is everything there is. However, if we 
take DCA literally, we are led to a semantics which is highly nonconstructive. One 
may call a semantics constructive ifT the set of consequences of any finite database is 
a recursively enumerable set, so that in principle there is some complete deductive 
system for the semantics. It is a common phenomenon in logic that a semantics 
which is based on a fixed infinite domain of discourse will often be very far from 
constructive; in the context of logic programming, this phenomenon has been 
pointed out in [l], [3], and [7]. 
See [23] and [24] for a comparison of Clark’s and Reiter’s approaches. A common 
drawback of both of approaches is that they do not allow for the possibility that the 
truth value of a query might be undefined because the interpreter fails to halt. In 
1938, Kleene (see [lo] or [ll]) suggested the use of three-valued logic to handle 
nontermination of computations, and this idea was applied in the context of logic 
programming by Lassez and Maher [14] and by Mycroft [19] to handle the problem 
of negative queries to pure Horn databases. Building on this, Fitting [7] gives a 
three-valued semantics for databases containing generalized program clauses. His 
approach may be viewed as adapting the DCA to a three-valued setting. He builds a 
three-valued least fixed-point semantics by transfinite recursion; as he points out, 
the recursion can, in the worst case, proceed through all the recursive ordinals and 
result in a semantics which is highly nonconstructive. As we point out in Section 8, 
this problem can occur even with pure Horn databases as soon as we allow negative 
queries (equivalently, positive queries to pure Horn databases could fail arbitrarily 
far out in the recursive ordinals). 
Our semantics is constructive, and we present two equivalent definitions of it. 
The first one goes through a construction similar to that of [7], but cuts it off 
arbitrarily at stage w. Here, although we follow DCA by working on only the 
Herbrand universe, constructiveness i  achieved by the cutoff. This definition makes 
it easy to see what the semantics actually says about specific databases, but perhaps 
the cutoff may seem to be merely a “trick” to achieve constructiveness. The other 
definition uses Clark’s CDB, but considers three-valued rather than two-valued 
models of it. Here, we achieve constructiveness by allowing the models to have 
domains of discourse extending the Herbrand universe. 
5. THE COMPLETED DATABASE 
We describe this in more detail, since it is basic for our semantics as well. The CDB 
may be thought of as a set of equality axioms, which do not depend on the 
database, plus a set of completed e$nitions derived from the database. 
The equality axioms are expressed in the language of first-order logic with 
equality (=). The language has a countably infinite set of constant symbols and, for 
each n, countably infinitely many n-place function symbols. To simplify discussions 
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of syntax, we consider constants to be O-place function symbols. The language has 
no predicate symbols other than = . In this language, define Clark’s equational 
theory (CET) to be the usual axioms of predicate logic with equality (asserting that 
= is an equivalence relation and that equals may be substituted for equals within 
any function), together with a set of axioms which we shall call the freeness axioms, 
because they assert that no objects are equal unless they are required to be equal by 
logic. More formally, the freeness axioms are the universal closures of the following 
three types of formulas. First: 
f(X,,..., K) +g(Y,,...,Y,) 
whenever f and g are distinct function symbols of n and m places, respectively; n 
and/or m may be 0 (in which case we omit the parentheses following the function 
symbol). Second: 
X#r 
whenever r is any term which contains the variable X. Third, we assert that each 
function is 1-1; that is, if f is n-place we have 
f(X,,..., X,)=f(Y,,...,Y,)-X,=Y,A *** AX,=Y,. 
We now consider models for CET. Since CET contains the usual axioms for 
equality, we may consider only models in which = is interpreted as true identity. 
By the standard model, we mean just the Herbrand universe. The domain of 
discourse of this model is the set of all ground terms, and function symbols have the 
obvious interpretation. In view of the distinctness axioms, euery model for CET 
contains an isomorphic copy of the standard model (see [16, Exercise 10, p. SS]), so 
we shall consider only models which extend the standard model. It is easily verified 
that 
Lemma 5.1. Let r1 and r2 be any terms. If r1 and r2 are uni$able, then 
CET t- 3(ri = r2). 
If they are not uni$able, then 
CETFV(r,#r*). 
PROOF. The first statement is obvious; the proof uses just the usual equality axioms, 
not the distinctness axioms. The second statement is easily proved by induction, 
using Robinson’s inductive test (algorithm) for unifiability. 0 
This lemma is actually a special case of the deeper result (Theorem 5.3), that CET 
is complete and decidable. By completeness, if + is any sentence in the language of 
CET, then it is provable from CET (i.e., true in all models of CET) iff it is true in 
the standard model. Decidable means that there is an algorithm for testing whether 
$I is provable from CET. Of course, this follows from completeness; simultaneously 
searching for a proof of + and -,+ provides an extremely inefficient algorithm; but 
in fact we shall outline a more reasonable decision procedure based on quantifier 
elimination. 
We emphasize that = is not a symbol used in the language of the database. If we 
wish to use an equality in a PROLOG database, we use a different symbol; e.g., 
“eq”, with the database containing the axiom eq(X, X). 
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We now discuss completed dejinitions in the context of extended program clauses. 
Recall (Section 2) that we may consider all such clauses to be of the form 
p(q,...7,):-4% 
where + is a formula of 
to be 
P(&...? x,) :- 3Yi 
where Y,,.. ., Yj are the 
variables. 
predicate logic. The normalization of this clause is defined 
variables occurring in the clause and Xi,. . . , X, are new 
If the n-place predicate p occurs m times in the head of a clause in DB, where 
m > 0, then the completed definition of p is 
where each p(X,,..., X,,) :- I,!J~ is the normalization of a clause in DB. In 
special case m = 0, the completed definition of p is 
vx, . . ~~‘x,(7P(X,,..., XJ). 
The completed database, CDB, is the set of axioms CET unioned with 
completed definitions of all predicate symbols. 
the 
the 
A very simple special case, which is sometimes ufficient o contrast our approach 
with others, occurs when all clauses in the database are propositional. If p is a 
O-place predicate symbol (i.e., a proposition letter), and p occurs as the head of 
clauses p :- $I~ for i = l,..., m, and the & are all ground, then the completed 
definition of p is just 
orjust 7p if m=O. 
Observe that the above definitions of CDB assume that the database is finite, or 
at least that each predicate symbol occurs in the head of only finitely many clauses; 
otherwise, we would have to express the CDB using infinitary disjunctions. At first, 
this seems to be no serious problem, since real programs are finite anyway. 
However, a finite database using variables has infinitely many ground instances. Let 
grnd(DB) be the set of all ground instances of clauses in DB. In ordinary resolution 
logic (with the standard semantics), it is well known that DB has a model iff 
grnd(DB) has a model, so that DB and gmd(DB) may be treated equivalently; in 
fact completeness theorems about resolution are usually proved by lifting ground 
proofs. This works becauses all assertions in DB are purely universal. However, 
PROLOG-style semantics involves existential quantifiers as well, so that the equiv- 
alence of DB with grnd(DB) is problematical. For example, if DB contains just the 
clause “p :- q(X)“, the completed definition of p is equivalent o 
P * 3XqCXL 
whereas in grnd(DB) the completed definition of p would have to be the infirmary 
statement 
p-+V{q(7):7isagroundterm}. 
Using such infinitary statements amounts to taking Reiter’s domain closure axiom 
literally, and will lead to a semantics which is highly noneffective. This is one way to 
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view the construction in [7]; see also our Theorem 6.6 and Section 8. Our semantics 
is effective because we allow models in which these infinitary statements need not 
hold. 
We now turn to the claimed completeness of CET. Perhaps the quickest proof 
would be to use the method of saturated models (see Section 5.4 of [4]). That is, it is 
quite easy to verify that CET has only infinite models, and that any two saturated 
models of the same cardinality are isomorphic. Decidability follows from complete- 
ness. 
A more elementary (and somewhat more complicated) proof of completeness and 
decidability proceeds by quantifier elimination. CET itself does not admit quantifier 
elimination [for example, 3X(Y =f( X)) is not equivalent to a quantifier-free (or 
even universal) property of Y], but quantifier elimination can be achieved if one 
adds symbols for the inverses of all the functions. More precisely, for each n-place 
function symbol f with n > 0, and each i = 1,. . . , n, adjoin to the language a 
l-place function inv,, with the axioms 
f(X,,..., X,) = Y 9 invfi( Y) = Xi 
and 
The point of the second axiom is that if Y is not in the range of f, then we are 
coding this fact by setting invfi(Y) = Y. Note that if Y is in the range of f, then 
invri (Y) # Y by the freeness axioms in CET. 
Call the resulting theory in the expanded language CET+. 
Lemma S.2. CET+ is a conservative extension of CET, and every formula in the 
language of CET+ is provably equivalent (from the axioms CET+) to a 
quantifier-free formula. 
PROOF. By “COnSerVatiVe eXtenSiOn," we mean that every sentence in the language 
of CET which is provable from CET+ is in fact provable from CET. This follows 
from the fact that CET+ is an extension by definitions; see Section 4.6 of [25]. 
To prove quantifier elimination, note that any formula of the form 3X+(X), with 
$ quantifier-free in the language of CET+, is equivalent to a finite disjunction of 
formulas of the form $(T), where 7 is a term constructed from the variables 
occurring in (p and the function symbols in the language of CET+. See Section 5.5 of 
[25] for more on this sort of argument. III 
Theorem 5.3. CET is complete and decidable. 
PROOF. CET+ decides the truth of all equations between ground terms and hence of 
all quantifier-free sentences, and using quantifier elimination, any sentence in the 
language of CET+ can be reduced to a quantifier-free sentence. 0 
As an example of the quantifier elimination, 3 Y( f (X, Y) = Z) is equivalent to 
f ( X, inv,*( X)) = Z. Also, if g is 2-place, then 
3X( f (inv,,(X), Y) = Z) 
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is equivalent to 
f(invgl( g(inv,,(Z), c)),Y) = Z; 
the c here could be replaced by any other term; the point is that f(U, Y) = Z forces 
U = invfl( Z), and U = inv,,( X) is satisfied whenever X = g( U, c). 
A related analysis of terms is discussed by Lassez and Marriott [15], but in a 
different framework. Their Herbrand universe was built from a fixed finite list of 
function and constant symbols (in which case CET+ would not be complete), 
whereas we are assuming infinitely many such symbols. 
6. FORMAL SEMANTICS 
We attempt to motivate our definition by some well-known examples. The following 
two simple propositional databases point out the problems with the CDB approach; 
similar problems arise with Reiter’s approach (see [23] and [24]). Let DBl be 
P :- q,not(q). 
q:- q. 
Let DB2 be 
p:- q. 
p :- not(q). 
q :- q. 
In DBl the completed definition of p is p * q A 7q, while in DB2 the completed 
definition of p is p t) q V 7q. In both, the completed definition of the proposition 
letter r is simply 7r. Now, both CDBs predict an answer of “yes” to the query “?- 
not(r)“, which is exactly what any PROLOG interpreter will give; but CDBl 
predicts a “yes” to . “7- not(p)“, and CDB2 predicts a “yes” to “?- p,” whereas any 
implementation which at all resembles PROLOG will fail to halt with queries 
involving p. There is an “out” here; we could simply say that this is just an example 
of incompleteness of the interpreter. However, although we must expect incomplete- 
ness eventually, it is strange that it must manifest itself with such trivial databases. 
Furthermore, this “out” is denied us by DB3: 
p :- not(p). 
Here, the CDB is p ++ 7p, which is inconsistent, and thus has all statements as 
logical consequences, o that any interpreter which gave any answer to “?- r ” would 
be sound by this definition. 
Instead, we take the approach of three-valued logic. We thus have three primitive 
truth values, t, f, and u (true, false, and undefined), with the truth tables those given 
by Kleene (see [lo] or Section 64 of [ll]); his motivation was also the description of 
computations which failed to return an answer. In all three examples, our semantics 
will imply that p has truth value u, which means that any sound interpreter must 
return “unclear” for queries “?- p” or “?- not(p)“, whereas the letter r will have 
truth value f as expected. 
Kleene’s truth tables can be summarized as follows. If + is a Boolean combina- 
tion of the atoms, t, f, and u, its truth value is t iff all possible ways of putting in t 
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or f for the various occurrences of u lead to a value t being computed in ordinary 
2-valued logic; + gets value f iff +$ gets value t, and $I gets value u otherwise. 
These truth values can be extended in the obvious way to predicate logic, 
thinking of the quantifiers as infinite conjunctions or disjunctions. Thus, 3X+(X) 
has truth value t iff there is at least one element in the domain of discourse at which 
$I is t, it has value f iff it is f at all elements, and it is u otherwise. Likewise for 
universal quantifiers. 
We shall describe two equivalent definitions of our formal semantics. The first 
one uses a construction similar to that of the “least Herbrand model”, as in [26], 
adapted for 3-valued logic in [7]. 
A partial interpretation is defined to be any (total) function I from the set of all 
ground atoms into {t,f,u}. Tbere is a natural notion of extension: I <J (J extends 
I) iff for all ground atoms (Y, if I(a) is t or f, then J(a) = I(a). We all I total iff 
I(a) is never u. 
A partial interpretation I is extended in a natural way to a function f defined on 
all sentences (formulas with no free variables); so for any sentence + of predicate 
logic, f(+) is either t, f, or u. This extension is obtained by following Kleene’s truth 
tables for 3-valued logic; in line with the domain closure axiom (see Section 4) we 
are considering our domhn of discourse to be just the Herbrand universe. Thus, for 
existential quantifiers, 1(3X+(X)) = t iff there is at least one closed term 7 for 
which f( c$( 7)) = t; the value is f iff for all closed r one has i( $( 7)) = f; the value is 
u otherwise. For univers; 1 quantifiers, f(VX+( X)) = f iff there is at least-one closed 
term 7 for which I(+)(T)) = f; the value is t iff for all closed r one has 1(+(r)) = t; 
the value is u otherwise. 
Now, we can view I as some partial information about the state of the world, and 





is the partial interpretation J such that for each ground atom (Y: 
J(a) = t iff for some clause 
PI- (P 
in the database, (Y = /IO for some ground substitution u such that 
i( C#Ia) = t. 
By u being ground, we mean that it replaces all yariables in /3 as well as all 
free variables in + by ground terms [otherwise I(+) would not be defined]. 
J(a) = f iff for all clauses 
P:- + 
in the database, and all ground substitutions u, if (Y = /?a, then 
&$a) = f. 
J(a) = u otherwise. 
The function ext is not increasing [i.e., 15 ext(1) need not hold], but it is 
monotone [i.e., I I J implies ext(1) I ext( J)], so that it has a least fixed point, I,. 
This I, may be constructed in the standard way by transfinite recursion: let I, be 
identically II, let IP+ 1 be ext(I,), and take limits at limit ordinals; more precisely, if 
p is a limit ordinal and OL is a ground atom, there must be an ordinal [ < p such that 
NEGATION IN LOGIC PROGRAMMING 299 
the values I,,(a) are constant for 5 < 77 < p, and we take this constant value for the 
value of I,(a). If we work in pure Horn logic, the set of true ground atoms stabilizes 
at w and corresponds to the usual minimal interpretation. However, even for pure 
Horn databases, the closure ordinal can be larger than all recursive ordinals, and the 
least tixed point can be a complete II: set, since the truth values of atoms can 
switch from u to f past w. For more this, see Section or see [7], 
a equivalent o our 
The suggestion is made [7] we class of PROLOG programs 
avoid a 
P, X)” to mean that 
program P terminates with input X. By the unsolvability of the halting problem 
plus the effectiveness of our semantics (see Theorem 6.2 below), there must be 
programs, prog, which in fact fail halt with all input values, so that a “no” answer is 
supported by I, for the query “?- term(prog, X)“, but for which 3Xterm(prog, X) 
does not get value f until stage o + 2. 
Instead, we chop this recursion off at w anyway in the definition of our 
s:mantics. If + is any sentence, we say that $I is supported by our semantics iff 
I,(+) = t for some finite n. Thus, in the example just given, a “no” answer is not 
supported. We shall show (Theorem 6.2) that our semantics is constructive. 
Terminating the recursion in this way may seem artificial, but we shall show 
(Theorem 6.3) that the same semantics is obtained in a more natural way by 
considering three-valued models of the CDB. 
Observe that for the three examples given at the beginning of this section, 
1, = I,, and the truth values of the letters are as advertised. More generally, 
Lemma 6.1. If the database is finite and consists of n ground clauses, then I, = I,,,l. 
We now show that in our semantics, the set of consequences of the database is 
recursively enumerable; by standard undecidability results, we cannot expect it to 
be recursive. 
Theorem 6.2. If the database if_f%zite, then for each jinite n, iU is decidable, and the 
set of all supported queries is recursively enumerable. 
PROOF. Our inductive definition of the I,, yields a computable function which 
assigns, to each sentence 9, natural number n, and truth value v, a sentence 
value(+, n, v), in the language of CET, which is true in the standard model of CET 
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(see Section 5) iff I,,($) = v. The theorem is now immediate from the decidability of 
CET (Theorem 5.3). 0 
In applications, we should think of this theorem being used with $I of the form 
V(#a), where + is the user’s query to the database and u is PROLOG’s answer 
[which should signify that V(J/a) follows from the database]. So, the set of logically 
correct answers to a query is recursively enumerable. 
One must be careful to distinguish our semantics from fU. If LY is an atomic 
sentence, then (Y is supported by our semantics iff IU,(~) = t. However, there are 
examples of atomic formulas J, such that VJ, is true at stage w but not at any finite 
stage (see Section 8); that is, all ground instances of # are supported by our 
semantics but V$J is not. The set of atomic 4 such that fU(V$) = t is not in general 
r.e., and in the worst case can be a complete II: set. 
We now turn to the second approach to obtaining our semantics-namely, via 
3-valued models for CDB. Roughly, a sentence is supported by our semantics iff it is 
a semantic consequence of CDB in 3-valued logic, but we must clarify two points 
about 3-valued models. First, we intend that in such models the equality is 2-valued. 
Thus, our models all consist of a base set, plus interpretations of the various 
functions in the usual 2-valued manner; = is interpreted as identity as usual, and 
we demand that the equality axioms CET be valid. Second, we must be careful 
about the propositional connective c) . Kleene’s 3-valued logic has the value of 
II t) u computed as u, and this is correct for the symbol t) occurring within an 
extended program or query clause, but it is wrong for the ++ added in the CDB. To 
avoid confusion, we demand that if extended program or query clauses use an “iff”, 
they write it as = , and we reserve @ for use in the CDB. Then = has Kleene’s 
3-valued truth table, whereas + ff 1c/ will have value t iff # and $J have the same 
value, and f otherwise (this truth table was suggested by tukasiewicz in 1920; see 
[ll]). So, for example, if the database has proposition letter p in the head of the one 
clause, 
then the completed definition of p is p CJ (q = q). For this to be true in a 3-valued 
model for CDB, it is necessary that q is u and p is u or that q is not u and p is t. 
That is, if q gets a definitive truth value than p must be true; otherwise, the 
computation of p cannot produce an answer. 
Theorem 6.3. Assume that the database is$nite, and let + be any sentence. Then the 
following are equivalent: 
(1) C$ has value t is every 3-valued model for CDB. 
(2) $X is supported by our semantics. 
PROOF. That (2) implies (1) is easily proved by induction on the stage at which 0 
becomes true. In proving (1) implies (2), we shall actually produce o,ne 3-valued 
model, N, for CDB, such that for every sentence (p, if (p is t in N, then I,($) = t for 
some finite n. N is obtained by an ultrapower construction. 
Let U be a countably incomplete ultrafilter on some index set S. Let M,, be the 
(3-valued) model whose base set is the set of ground terms, and whose truth values 
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are determined by I,, and let N, be the ultrapower (M,)‘/U. All the N, have the 
same base set, and they all interpret function symbols the same way. For each 
formula, 3, with free variables X1,. . . , X,, let us use val($, a,, . . . , ak, NJ to denote 
the truth value of 4 in N, at the k-tuple of elements a,, . . , , ak. This cumbersome 
notation is necessitated by the fact that, unlike in the Herbrand model case, not all 
elements of N,, are the denotations of terms. Observe that the N, cohere in the sense 
that if v is either t or f and val($, a,,. .., ak, NJ = v, then for all m > n, 
val(+Y al?. . . , sky N,) = v also; this holds because the M, cohere and the ultrapower 
produces elementary equivalent structures. We may thus define the limit, N, of the 
N,,. This model has the same base set as the N,, with truth values computed as 
follows. For each atomic formula J, with variables Xi,. . . , X,, for each a,, . . . , ak in 
the model, and for each truth value v, we set val(JI, a,, . . ., ak, N) = v if the 
val(J/, al,. . . , ak, NJ are v for all n larger than some n,. 
Observe that N is similar to our 1,. However, unlike I,, we have the following 
continuityproperty: If J, is any formula, v a truth value, and val( #, a,, . . . , ak, N) = v, 
then val(JI, a,, . . . , ak, N,) = v for all n larger than some n,. For J, atomic, 
continuity holds by definition, and we may prove continuity in general by induction 
on complexity. The induction passes easily over propositional connectives. To 
illustrate the step for quantifiers in the place where it is nontrivial, assume that # 
has free variable X, that 4 is 3YX, and that continuity has been proved for X. Now 
suppose that u is the eventual value of the val( $, a, N,,), so that for each n, we have 
val(+, a, N,) = u. Then for each b in the base set and each n, val(x, a, b, NJ must 
be f or u, with at least one b, having val(x, a, b,, N,) = u. Since the N, cohere, we 
have also val(x, a, b,,, N,) = u for all m < n. But now, since the ultrapower yields a 
saturated model, we may choose a b such that for all m, val(X, a, b, N,) = u. Then, 
by continuity for x, val(x, a, b, N) = u. Again by continuity for X, there is no c for 
which val(x, a, c, N) = t. Thus, val($, a, N) = u. 
By continuity, if $I is any sentence with value t in N, then + must have value t in 
some N,, which implies, since the ultrapower defines an elementary embedding, that 
I,(+) is t. Also, using continuity, it is easy to show that N is indeed a 3-valued 
model for CDB. 0 
2-valued models are a special case of 3-valued models, so we now have proved 
that our semantics is more restrictive than Clark’s CDB semantics. 
Corollary 6.4. Assume that the database is finite and + is any sentence. If + is 
supported by our semantics, then $ is a logical consequence in 2-valued logic 
of CDB. 
The converse of this corollary is false, as the examples in the beginning of this 
section show. One can verify, however, that in the case of pure Horn logic, where 
the semantics was never problematical, the various approaches to semantics all 
agree. 
Theorem 6.5. Assume the database is finite and pure Horn, and assume $ is a pure 
Horn query clause (that is, a conjunction of atoms). Then the following are 







t/+ is a (2-valued) semantic consequence of the database. 
VC#J is a (2-valued) semantic consequence of CDB. 
I,(V@) = t. 
V+ is supported by our semantics. 
corresponds to models which allow only the Herbrand universe as elements. 
The following is the appropriate analogue of Theorem 6.3, and is much easier to 
verify. 
Theorem 6.6. Assume the database if finite and + is any sentence. Then the following 
are equivalent: 
(1) $J has value t in any 3-valued model for CDB whose domain of discourse is just 
the set of closed terms. 
(2) I,(G) = t. 
As in other approaches to PROLOG semantics, we may easily verify that the 
translation in [17] from extended program clauses to generalized program clauses 
(called their general form; see p. 229) is correct. Essentially the same proof as in [17] 
works; namely show by induction that: 
Theorem 6.7. Let DB be aJinite database consisting of extended program clauses, and 
form the database DB’ by replacing each clause by its general form. Use DB to form 
the IP and DB’ to form the I;. Then for each formula 9, there is a finite n such that 
whenever +a is any ground instance of +, p is any ordinal, and v is t or f, 
&(@I) = v iflj,‘+,(+o) = v. 
[17] does not actually use the propositional connective E in extended program 
clause, but it can easily be included (there and here), and then replaced in the 
standard way by + and A in the passage to generalized program clauses. 
Observe that in our three-valued semantics, an extended query clause which is a 
classical (two-valued) tautology may fail to be supported; this can happen even 
when the query is itself in the database or the CDB. For example, suppose the 
database consists of the single clause “r :- r “; then the CDB contains r @ r plus 
the negations of all other proposition letters. Then Ia = u, which gives r tf r 
value t, but the queries “?- r :- r” and “?- r = r ” (note the different IY in the query 
clause) have value u, not t. At first sight this seems pathological, but it corresponds 
with the fact that the translations of these queries into standard PROLOG (e.g., “?- 
(not(r); r)“) will cause an infinite loop with this database. 
7. ANSWER SUBSTITUTIONS 
Elsewhere in this paper we have attempted to contrast our approach with other 
approaches. For example, in Section 6 we presented some simple ground databases 
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in which a query is supported by the CDB, but not by our semantics. In Section 8, 
we will point out the noneffectiveness that can occur if we consider 1p for infinite p. 
In this section, we consider a class of examples where all the standard approaches 
to semantics agree. Here, effectiveness i not a problem, as 1, = I,, for some small 
n. In these examples, also, our approach and the CDB approach agree. Our intent is 
to illustrate the complexity of the computed answer substitutions, and therefore the 
difficulty of constructing a practical PROLOG interpreter which is complete for our 






nonc( X) :- not isc( X). 
This database is finitely determinate; that is, for some finite n (= 4 here), I, = In, 
and every ground atom receives value t or f. In our (and the CDB) semantics, p(X) 
is true of everything, since “is? is true of “c” and “none” is true of everything but 
“c”. Hence, an answer of “no” is supported to “?- q”. Any term other than “c” 
could be correctly returned as an answer to the query “?- nonc( X)“; a complete 
interpreter presumably should return the answer “XZ c”. 
This example illustrates the point is that even if we only care about our 
interpreter being complete for ground queries such as “?- q”, such an interpreter 
would have to produce complete answers to nonground queries as intermediate 
steps. Thus, in any case, we are forced to design an interpreter which returns 
complete answers to nonground queries as well. These complete answers need not be 
just equations of the form “X= u “, as in ordinary PROLOG, but could be 
negations of these equations, or arbitrary Boolean combinations of these equations. 
In fact, given any set of terms which can be described within the theory CET (see 
Section 5), one can find a finitely determinate database for which this set is the 
complete answer. 
An interpreter which would find answers in situations like this could operate like 
the following version of parallel PROLOG. Each intermediate goal is not terminated, 
but receives answer substitutions from its children. As these substitutions accu- 
mulate, they are not merely communicated to the parent, but they are amalgamated 
into a more general form if possible. Thus, the process working on “-? q ” invokes a 
child working on “?- p(X)” and grandchildren working on “?- isc( X)” and “?- 
none(X)“. When the “?- p(X)” process eventually receives an “X = c ” and an 
“X # c” from its children, it amalgamates these and sends an X= X (identity 
substitution) to its parent, which now can fail q. This amalgamation procedure is 
the general case is related to the quantifier elimination procedure for CET (see 
Lemma 5.2). 
8. NONEFFECTIVENESS 
Although our semantics only uses 1, for finite n, we remark here on the complexity 
of 1,. We shall be fairly brief, since similar results are known in the literature, most 
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recently in [7]. The main point is that any semantics based on a fixed infinite 
domain of discourse (such as the Herbrand universe) is bound to have high logical 
complexity. Blair [3] was the first. to point this out in the context of logic 
programming. In our semantics, the noneffectiveness can occur even with pure Horn 
databases, since atoms can switch in value from u to f arbitrarily far out in the 
recursive ordinals. 
Recall that 6.~:~ denotes Church-Kleene omega one-ie., the first infinite ordinal 
not isomorphic to a recursive well-ordering of w. The following fact is a special case 
of a much more general results on inductive closures, due to Barwise, Gandy, and 
Moschovakis; see [9], Chapter 6 of [2], or chapter 9 of [18]. 
Theorem 8.1. If DB is jinite (or injinite and recursive), then Iwy, = I,, and 
{$:+isgroundandfm(+)=t} 
is a fli set. 
Also, in view of the fact that our semantics is r.e. (Theorem 6.2) 
Theorem 8.2. If DB is finite, then 
{ # : J, is atomic and iti (V#) = t} 
is a lXq set. 
These two theorems are best possible; this can be seen by exploring the fact that 
as we continue the iteration into infinite ordinals, it becomes possible to express 
arbitrary quantification over the natural numbers. More precisely, let us use s as a 
l-place function and let us use 0 as a constant. For each natural number n, let n_ 
represent the closed term formed by applying s n times to 0. In this way, our 
PROLOG databases can talk about natural numbers without departing from pure 
logic (such a treatment of natural numbers is the official one in IC-PROLOG [6]). 
Before we state any theorems, we consider the following very simple example: 
number(O). 
number( s( X)) :- number( X). 
void(s( X)) :- void(X). 
The predicate number(X) defines the set of terms representing natural numbers. 
The predicate void(X) becomes f for all terms by stage o, so I,(VX, void(X)) = t, 
so a semantics based on 1, would support a “no” answer to “?- void(X)“. Real 
PROLOG will return an infinite loop with this query, corresponding to the fact that 
Z,(VX, void(X)) = u for all finite k. 
Following Blair [3], we can represent all recursive and r.e. sets of natural numbers 
by pure Horn databases. He shows that if P is any recursive set, there is a finite 
pure Horn database involving the l-place predicate p (plus other predicates and 
functions) such that for each natural number n, I,( p( 7)) is t when T is of the form 
n_ for n E P, and f for 7 any other closed term. Analogous results hold if P is any 
recursive predicate in several variables. The proof in [3] uses the fact that one can 
simulate a Turing machine in pure Horn logic; one could also use induction on the 
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construction of the recursive functions by primitive recursion, composition, and the 
p operator. We remark that P cannot be an arbitrary recursive set of closed terms, 
since for pure Horn databases, if p(c) is t for a constant c not mentioned in the 
database, then p(7) must be t for all closed terms. 
Recursively enumerable sets of natural numbers can be represented in the 
following weaker sense: 
Lemma 8.3, If Q is any r.e. set of natural numbers, then there is a finite pure Horn 
database involving the I-place predicate q such that for each natural number n, 
I,(q( n)) is t for n E Q and u otherwise; and I,(q(r)) is f for closed terms r 
which do not represent natural numbers. 
PROOF. Suppose that Q is the projection of the primitive recursive 2-place predicate 
P. Add the clause “q(X) :- number(X), p( X, Y).” to a database which represents 
P by p and contains the above definition of “number”. q 
Of course, similar results hold when Q is an r.e. predicate in several variables. 
Theorem 8.4. Let R be any no, set of natural numbers. Then there is a finite database 
using generalized program clauses such that for any natural number n, 
I,(VYq(n_, Y)) = t iffn E R. 
PROOF. Suppose n E R iff (n, m) E Q for all m, where Q is r.e. A (pure Horn) 
database representing Q almost works, but q(n, Y) will be false when Y is 
instantiated to a term which does not represent a number, so add to such a database 
the definition of “number” above plus: 
q(X, Y) :- notanumber(Y). 
notanumber( Y) :- not(number( Y)). 0 
The use of “not” in this database seems trivial, but cannot be avoided in view of 
Theorem 6.5. However, even for pure Horn databases, the complexity of I, can be 
large, since any II: set can be represented as the set of n for which Z, supports a 
“yes” answer to “?- not( r( n_))“. 
Theorem 8.5. Let R be any Et set of natural numbers. Then there is a finite pure Horn 
database such that for any natural number n, I,(r(n)) = f tJrn E R. 
PROOF. By the Suslin-Kleene analysis, there is a primitive recursive total ordering T, 
of the natural numbers and a primitive recursive set Q of pairs, such that for each n, 
nER iff Q,=(m:( n, m) E Q } is well ordered by T. We may choose T and Q so 
that 0 is the top element in the order T, and so that for all n, (n,O) E Q. Add the 
following to a database that represents T and Q by t and q: 
r(X):-p(X,O). 
P(X, y) :- 0, y), 4(x v>, P(X, v). 
By stage w, truth values for t and q will be completely determined. Note that r(n) 
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and p(n, m) can never get value t. p(g, rn) will get value f at a stage p > o iff by 
this stage, p(n, j) already has value f for all j such that jTm and j E Q,. Thus, 
p(n, 0) and r(n_ j will eventually become f iff Q, is well ordered. If Q, is not well 
ordered, then p(n_, wz) will eventually become f only for m in the well-ordered 
initial part of Q,; for other m, including m = 0, the truth value will remain u 
forever. 0 
The closure ordinal order such a database must be exactly tifK unless R is 
hyperarithmetical. By modifying this example, one may, as in [3], construct finite 
databases whose closure ordinal is any recursive ordinal, or whose complexity is any 
desired level in the Kleene hierarchy. 
9. PROLOG INTERPRETERS 
Since our semantics is based upon what we expect PROLOG to do, we should 
investigate whether it in fact corresponds to the answers returned by a PROLOG- 
style interpreter. In the best case, we would like a completeness theorem, but at least 
we should verify that the standard approaches to PROLOG are sound. 
If we restrict ourselves to finite propositional databases, everything works per- 
fectly. We can describe a query evaluation procedure that returns “yes” if and only 
if the query is supported. As in the case even with pure Horn logic, we must allow 
this procedure to be nondeterministic. There are two possible places for nonde- 
terminism: the first is in the choice of the ordering of the clauses, and the second is 
in the choice of the ordering of the literals in each clause; these places correspond to 
OR parallelism and AND parallelism in a parallel implementation. In pure Horn 
logic, only the first nondeterminism is needed (see [5] or Section 9 of [16]); however, 
once we have added a “not”, we need the second as well for completeness. For 
example, if the database is 
p :- q, r. 
4 :- 4. > 
the query “?- not(p)” should return CL yes”, which requires the interpreter to 
evaluate the r before the q in the first clause. 
Now, assume a finite database DB is given. We present our evaluation procedure 
in the form of pseudocode for a nondeterministic automaton; the points of 
nondeterminism are labeled by “CHOOSE". We call our main procedure eval; it is fed 
a list I#J (possibly empty) of literals, and, if it halts, returns either “yes” or “no”. 
Semantically, the list denotes its conjunction; in line with this, we identify the 
empty list with true. 
For such an evaluation procedure, soundness means that under any choices in the 
nondeterminism, if “yes” is returned then (p (i.e., the conjunction of the list) gets 
value t in our semantics, and if “no” is returned, then $ gets value f. Since “yes” 
and “no” are the only possible outputs here, soundness requires that if + has value 
u, then all choices must fail to halt. Completeness means that if 9 gets value t in our 
semantics, then some choices lead to “yes” being returned, and if $J gets value f, 
then some choices lead to a “no”. 
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If + is such a list and A is a literal on that list, then + - {h } denotes the list with 
the first occurrence of A deleted. Our procedure has a subroutine, evallit, which 
computes the truth value of a literal. 
function eval(cp). 
if + is empty return (“yes”). 
CHOOSE a literal, A in $ 
if evallit( X) = “no” return “ no” 
if evallit( h) = “yes” return eval( + - { h }) 
function evallit( A) 
if X is negative, ye then 
if evallit( cx) = “ yes” return “ no” 
if evallit( a) = “no” return “yes” 
if X is positive then 
CHOOSE an ordering, { J, i, . . . , qk } of all 
bodies of clauses in DB with head A 
for i := 1 to k do 
if eval( \c, , ) = “ yes” return “ yes” 
return (“no”) 
/* so, if k = 0, we return “no” */ 
Theorem 9.1. The interpreter eval is sound and complete 
PROOF. Soundness is proved by induction on the number of recursive calls to eval. 
Completeness is proved by induction on the (finite by Lemma 6.1) stage at which + 
receives truth value t or f. q 
One might replace the nondeterminism by some sort of fairness assumption, as in 
Lassez and Maher [13], which guarantees that all choices eventually get searched. 
Both nondeterminism and fairness would, if actually implemented, have the effect of 
replacing the depth-first search of standard PROLOG by a breadth-first search. 
It is easy to see how to modify this (in theory) to work in predicate logic; see the 
remarks at the end of Section 7. This would require the interpreter to keep track of 
arbitrarily complex descriptions of answers. One may view IC-PROLOG [6] and 
MU-PROLOG [20,21] as subsets of this ideal interpreter which return an error 
message when forced to deal with an answer more complicated than a simple 
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